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IS THE GOVERNMENT IN MY POCKET? AN OVERVIEW
OF GOVERNMENT LOCATION TRACKING OF CELL
PHONES UNDER THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
AND IN MONTANA
Briana Schwandt*
"Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have
become available to the government .... The progress of science
in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not
likely to stop with wire tapping."
Justice Brandeis1
I. INTRODUCTION
Most Americans love the convenience of having a cell phone. We
carry them around in our pockets, our purses, and our backpacks. We can
make calls, receive calls, text message, browse the Internet, and receive
directions at the drop of a dime right from our phones. What most of us do
not know is that even if our phones are not enabled with global positioning
system ("GPS") technology, they can be tracked. A disturbing trend has
arisen in which law enforcement agencies obtain cell phone records without
subscribers' knowledge or consent, sometimes without the authority of a
neutral and detached judge. Law enforcement uses the records not only to
determine where subscribers have been, but also to track them in real time.
Essentially, cell phones are capable of being used as personal tracking de-
vices that can monitor a subscriber's every move. The only way subscrib-
ers can prevent tracking is to turn off their phones.
Federal laws governing electronic monitoring are sorely outdated. Ad-
ding to the confusion, federal courts apply these outdated statutes with dif-
fering outcomes, leaving practitioners without clear guidance on how to
approach this growing trend. The very nature of the record request pro-
ceedings has resulted in little precedent for courts to follow. After all, when
the government seeks permission to obtain records, it does so without in-
forming the target. Therefore, there is no defendant when a court grants the
request. And when the request is denied, the federal or state government
does not appeal. In Montana, neither the Legislature nor the courts have
* Briana Schwandt, Student Author, graduated from the University of Montana School of Law in
the Spring of 2011. The author would like to thank Betsy Griffing for all her encouragement and help
with this article.
1. Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 473-474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled, Katz v.
U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
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addressed the particular issue of cell phone location tracking, forcing practi-
tioners to invent creative arguments to deal with possible violations of their
clients' rights.
Although most searches of cell phone subscribers' records are a neces-
sary tool for law enforcement, this technology has significant potential for
abuse. To ensure that neither federal nor state constitutional rights are in-
fringed, law enforcement should be required to obtain a search warrant
based on probable cause to receive these personal and revealing records.
Without such a showing, the constitutional rights of Montana citizens are
compromised, and the intentions of the 1972 Montana Constitution's draft-
ers are blatantly disregarded.
This article provides an overview of federal and Montana law on the
topic of cell phone location tracking and is intended to raise awareness
about the government's ability to locate individuals through that technol-
ogy. It does not attempt to describe the technology in detail, but merely to
provide a broad understanding. The article focuses on how the law is deal-
ing with this technology as it collides with citizens' right of privacy and the
requirements of search and seizure under federal and Montana law.
Section II of this article provides a general overview of the basics of
cell phone location tracking technology, 2 its possible constitutional implica-
tions under the federal Constitution, and the current federal laws that gov-
ern electronic monitoring. Section III discusses federal case law interpret-
ing the federal statutes and concerning electronic monitoring in general.
Section IV provides a detailed discussion of the transcripts of the 1972
Montana Constitutional Convention and Montana case law pertinent to the
discussion of cell phone location tracking. Finally, Section V explores the
legal trend of location tracking jurisprudence and provides a conclusion
about the practice in Montana.
II. OVERVIEW OF CELL PHONE LOCATION TRACKING
Anytime a cell phone is turned on, even if the phone is not being used
to make or receive a call, it can be located. This is possible because of a
process called "registration." 3 To maintain the strongest signal, the phone
searches for the nearest tower every seven seconds. 4 The data generated
during registration contains no communication; it only identifies the towers
to and from which the phone is sending and receiving signals. 5 Cell phone
2. For a more detailed description of this technology, see In re Application for Pen Register &
Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
3. Timothy Stapleton, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act and Cell Location Data: Is the
Whole More Than the Sum of Its Parts?, 73 Brook. L. Rev. 383, 387 (2007).
4. Application for Pen Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 750.
5. Stapleton, supra n. 3. at 387.
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service providers store all of this data.6 Although no communications are
involved, this information allows law enforcement to determine the location
of the cell phone and, hence, the location of the cell phone's owner. Be-
cause no communications are involved with these transmissions, attempts
by law enforcement to access this data have raised differences in interpreta-
tion by courts of Fourth Amendment search and seizure requirements, statu-
tory requirements, and the right of privacy.
Registration information can be divided into real-time and historical
data. On the one hand, real-time data allows the government to track the
current whereabouts of a suspect.7 On the other hand, historical data allows
the government to determine the whereabouts of a suspect at a previous
point in time by looking at the service provider's stored records. 8 Law en-
forcement can use real-time data to find a fugitive or even a kidnapping
suspect. In one situation, a victim's phone was in her car when it was sto-
len, and the phone was used to track the whereabouts of the stolen car and
suspect. 9 Historical data can be used to corroborate or disprove a suspect's
alibi, as it was used to disprove Scott Peterson's alibi and help convict him
of the murder of his wife, Lacey Peterson.' 0
Although these illustrations provide examples where this information
was used to produce positive results, the use of this information is poten-
tially subject to great abuse when not checked by a neutral judiciary.
The government has several methods to access cell phone users' loca-
tions. The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") has mandated
6. In re Application of U.S. for an Or. Authorizing Installation & Use of a Pen Register & a
Caller Identification Sys. on Tel. Nos. (Sealed), 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 599 (D. Md. 2005).
7. Id. at 598.
8. Kevin McLaughlin, The Fourth Amendment and Cell Phone Location Tracking: Where Are
We?, 29 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 421, 431-432 (2007).
9. See Stapleton, supra n. 3, at 383-384. "In one case, a thief stole a woman's car with her child
and her cell phone inside. The police were able to stop the car and rescue the child within thirty minutes
by tracking the woman's cell phone." Id. (citing Girl, 5, Found Safe as Man Steals Car, Rocky Mt.
News A18 (Apr. 22, 2004). See Lockwood, infra n. 18, at 310. "Throughout his journey, U.S. marshals
tracked his movements by monitoring his cell phone usage until a police officer recognized the rented
vehicle and began a high-speed pursuit that ended with the suspect's capture." Id. (citing Don Plummer,
Cellphone Betrays Cobb Fugitive, Atlanta J. Const. Al (Nov. 9, 2003).
10. See Stapleton, supra n. 3, at 383. "In California, the evidence used to convict Scott Peterson of
murdering his wife included location data gleaned from his cell phone that undermined his alibi." Id.
(citing Diana Walsh & Stacy Finz, The Peterson Trial: Defendant Lied Often, Recorded Calls Show
Supporters Misled About Whereabouts, S.F. Chron. B1 (Aug. 26, 2004); see also Lockwood, infra n. 18,
at 310-311. "[H]e told police he was not in the area at the time of the murder. However, cell phone
records proved otherwise. The cell tower information for his calls placed him within blocks of the scene
of the crime both before and three minutes after the shooting. Records further indicated that during the
actual murder, he likely had the phone turned off. Prosecutors argued this was also inculpatory in that
someone who was secretly stalking a victim would not want a cell phone call to alert the victim to his
presence." Id. (citing Holley Gilbert, Vancouver Man is Arrested in Shooting Death of Ex-Girlfriend,
Portland Oregonian B 1 (Apr. 30, 2004)).
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implementation of a system whereby 911 operators are able to determine
the location of callers from their cell phones. This system has increased the
availability of and ease with which location data can be gathered by law
enforcement. The methods for obtaining location data include Global Posi-
tioning System ("GPS") technology, Time Difference of Arrival
("TDOA"), and Angle of Arrival ("AOA"). Each method will be explored
in turn.
With the advent of cell phones, 911 operators were alarmed they could
not determine the location of distressed cell phone callers. To combat this
problem and ensure the viability of the 911 emergency system, the FCC
began issuing regulations in 1996 to ensure 911 operators could locate the
callers through cell service providers' records. These regulations require
service providers to make this information available to 911 operators.1'
The FCC also established a December 31, 2005 deadline for service provid-
ers to implement the necessary equipment and personnel to supply 911 op-
erators with a caller's location within 150 meters. 12 The service providers
typically use one of three methods to determine the cell phone's location.
The methods include GPS technology, TDOA, or AOA. Although other
methods exist, such as single cell site data, these three methods are the most
accurate and the only three that will be discussed.
GPS only works on cell phones enabled with GPS technology. GPS is
accurate in providing a cell phone's location within 10 to 20 meters as long
as no obstructions like trees or tall buildings interfere with the signal.' 3
GPS-enabled cell phones contain a GPS receiver that receives signals trans-
mitted from several satellites, which indicate each satellite's location and
the current time.' 4 At least 24 GPS satellites are in the sky at all times. 15
When a cell phone's GPS receiver obtains information from at least four of
these satellites, the receiver can estimate the distance to each satellite and
calculate the phone's position in three dimensions. 16 GPS technology is
becoming more popular in cell phones so that their users are able to enjoy
navigation functions, turn-by-turn directions, and even track family mem-
11. 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(b) (2008).
12. 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 (2004) (requiring service providers to "achieve 95 percent penetration of
location-capable handsets among its subscribers" by December 31, 2005). To learn more about the
requirements of the different phases of this legislation, see Steven B. Toeniskoetter, Preventing a Mod-
ern Panopticon: Law Enforcement Acquisition of Real-Time Cellular Tracking Data, 13 Rich. J.L. &
Tech. 16 (Spr. 2007).
13. Smithsonian Natl. Air & Space Museum, How Does GPS Work?, http://www.nasm.si.edu/exhi-
bitions/gps/work.html (last accessed March 21, 2011).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. For more detailed information on how this technology works, see Smithsonian Natl. Air &
Space Museum, GPS in More Detail, http://www.nasm.si.edu/exhibitions/gps/spheres.html (last ac-
cessed March 21, 2011).
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4
Montana Law Review, Vol. 72 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol72/iss2/3
2011 GOVERNMENT LOCATION TRACKING OF CELL PHONES 265
bers directly from their phones. Thus, more cell phone users can now be
tracked through GPS technology.
Even if a person does not have a GPS-enabled cell phone, he or she
can still be located through the use of signal triangulation. Signal triangula-
tion uses the service providers' cell towers to obtain location information or
"cell site data." Triangulation can be achieved through TDOA or AOA.
Time Difference of Arrival ("TDOA") is a system that enables the
service provider to determine the cell phone's longitude and latitude either
during registration 17 or when a call is made or received. This requires cell
phone towers to estimate the time it takes the tower's signal to reach the
cell phone or vice versa. With these estimates, the tower can determine the
distance of the cell phone from the tower and, if more than one tower re-
ceives a signal, "an algorithm allows the system to determine coordinates
corresponding to the phone's latitude and longitude."' 8
Angle of Arrival ("AOA") is similar to TDOA in that it uses signals
between cell towers and cell phones. However, rather than measuring the
amount of time a signal takes to travel from the cell phone to the tower,
AOA technology enables the tower to record the angle of the signal as it
arrives at the tower. 19 When more than one tower receives the signal, the
differences in the angles of arrival are compared (triangulated) to determine
the relative location of the cell phone.20
In rural settings with fewer towers, like in Montana, the location infor-
mation provided by triangulation may be significantly less accurate. This
occurs simply because fewer towers exist with which comparison of the cell
signals' angles or distances can be achieved. When only a single tower
exists to cover several hundred miles, neither the TDOA nor the AOA
methods will work.2 1 However, GPS technology still functions.
III. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY IMPLICATIONS
Cell phone tracking technology has outgrown traditional constitutional
and statutory analysis: "When new technology emerges, the first applica-
tions of the law try to build on old paradigms, generally without contem-
plating whether the new tools challenge the implicit assumptions of the
past."22 The drafters of the federal statutes that govern other types of sur-
17. Recall that registration is the process whereby the cell phone emits signals every seven seconds
to find the closest tower and ensure the highest quality calls.
18. Stephanie Lockwood, Who Knows Where You've Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use
of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 307, 308-309 (2004).
19. Id. at 309.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 309-310.
22. Ian James Samuel, Warrantless Location Tracking, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1324, 1328 (2008).
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veillance simply did not contemplate cell phone location tracking. Thus,
federal district court interpretations of these statutes as applied to requests
for cell site data have produced mixed results.
A. Federal Constitutional Implications
The two most obvious constitutional rights triggered by law enforce-
ment's use of cell phone location tracking are a citizen's Fourth Amend-
ment right against unreasonable searches and seizures and a citizen's right
of privacy. Courts have had to determine if the practice of obtaining cell
site data records, whether historical or real-time, constitutes a search under
the Fourth Amendment and whether cell phone users have a right of privacy
in the cell phone records held by third-party service providers. Since this is
such a new area of the law, practitioners have not yet developed constitu-
tional arguments as has been done with pen registers and trap and trace
devices. 23 Parties have argued additional constitutional implications in
cases dealing with these similar but older technologies, and with the proper
facts, the arguments might be utilized in the area of cell phone location
tracking as well.
The rights of association, free speech, and a free press are also poten-
tially implicated in cell phone location tracking. As with the pen register,
trap and trace, and wiretap cases, some argue that tracking an individual's
location through a cell phone violates the right of association. 24 In O'Neal
v. United States, the Internal Revenue Service issued a summons to the
telephone company requesting its toll records for the previous six months
and that the telephone numbers identified on the toll records include the
names and addresses of the holders.2 5 The plaintiff-subscriber argued that
including this information amounted to a compelled disclosure of his asso-
ciation's membership list and that the revelation of this list would have a
chilling effect on his right of association. 26 Although this argument did not
persuade the court, the right of association can be bolstered with the free-
dom of speech. In NAACP v. Alabama,27 the United States Supreme Court
held that freedom of association is an essential part of the freedom of
23. A pen register is "a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or
signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communi-
cation is transmitted .... 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2006). A trap and trace device is "a device or process
which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number or other
dialing, routing, addressing. and signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire
or electronic communication . . " 18 U.S.C. § 3127 (4).
24. See O'Neal v. U.S., 601 F. Supp. 874 (N.D. Ind. 1985).
25. Id. at 875-876.
26. Id. at 876. The court held that the plaintiff-subscriber failed to show compelled disclosure and
consequences objectively suggesting an impact on the members' associational rights. Id. at 878-880.
27. NAACP v. Ala. ex. rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
Vol. 72
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speech because people often cannot engage in effective speech unless they
join with others. 28 The Court also held that the Constitution affords these
rights to state citizens against state governments through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 29 Another possible constitutional
implication might be the government's violation of a journalist's freedom
of press under the First Amendment. Cell phone location tracking may re-
veal sensitive information about the identity and location of a journalist's
source of information on a sensitive story and may therefore interfere with a
journalist's ability to gather news. 30
B. Federal Statutory Implications
Several federal statutes deal with how and when the government may
use surveillance devices such as pen registers and trap and trace devices.
None of these statutes specifically deal with cell phone location tracking.
Nonetheless, the Wiretap Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, and the Mobile
Tracking Device Statute are particularly relevant.
The "Wiretap Act" is Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968.31 The Act sets forth strict procedural requirements for
law enforcement to follow when intercepting wire communications and pro-
hibits public parties from intercepting any covered communications. 32
After the advent of electronic mail and cell phones, Congress passed
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA") to deal with
these new technologies. 33 Title I of the ECPA generally extends the protec-
tions of the Wiretap Act to electronic communications. However, it specifi-
cally exempts electronic communications from the statutory suppression
remedies available to wire or oral communications under the Wiretap Act
while leaving Fourth Amendment remedies intact. 34 Title I also includes
language regarding mobile tracking devices. 35 Title II, commonly referred
28. Id. at 460-461.
29. Id.
30. See Rptrs. Comm. for Freedom of Press v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F. 2d 1030, 1046-1047
(D.C. 1978).
31. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 212-223 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2520).
32. Id. The Wiretap Act will not be discussed in any greater detail because of its limited relevance
to cell phone location tracking. See U.S. '. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 948-949 (2004).
33. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1367, 2521, 2701-2711,
3117, 3121-3127).
34. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(10)(a), (c); U.S. v. Gbemisola, 225 F.3d 753, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(stating § 3117 does not specifically prohibit installation that does not conform to the statute and that
violation of the statute does not result in exclusion of evidence unless the Fourth Amendment is also
violated during installation).
35. Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 108(a), 100 Stat. 1848, 1858 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3117).
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to as the "Stored Communications Act" ("SCA"), protects stored communi-
cations and transactional records. 36 Title III, the "Pen Register Act," deals
with pen registers and trap and trace devices. 37
In 1994, Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law En-
forcement Act of 1994 ("CALEA"). 38 This Act enumerates telecommuni-
cations carriers' obligations to help law enforcement intercept digital com-
munications. 39
Title I of the ECPA, the Mobile Tracking Device Statute, defines a
tracking device as "an electronic or mechanical device which permits the
tracking of the movement of a person or object." 40 To install a tracking
device, the government must get a warrant or other order from a court in the
jurisdiction in which the device will be installed. 41 This statute specifically
allows the use of the device in other jurisdictions as long as it was installed
in the jurisdiction in which the court order or warrant was issued.42 An
"electronic communication" is defined as "any transfer of signs, signals,
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in
whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or
photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce . . .43
Although the signal produced by the tracking device would seem to qualify
as an electronic communication, the definition specifically excludes the sig-
nals produced by tracking devices. 44 Because of this exclusion, the statu-
tory requirements of the ECPA do not apply to cell site data and an individ-
ual cannot rely on their protections.
Under the Stored Communications Act, Title II of the ECPA, govern-
ment agencies must follow a complicated statutory scheme to obtain elec-
tronically stored transactional records and communications. Electronically
stored communications are those "communications obtained in a manner
not simultaneous with their transmission. '45 Under the Act, stored records
are identified as communications stored less than 180 days, communica-
tions stored more than 180 days, or transactional or subscriber informa-
36. Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201(a), 100 Stat. 1848, 1860 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-2711).
37. Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 301(a), 100 Stat. 1848, 1868 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3121-3127).
38. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010).
39. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b).
41. Id. at § 3117(a).
42. Id.
43. Id. at § 2510(12).
44. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(C) (the signal an electronic device produces is not to be considered
an "electronic communication," and so the statutory requirements of the ECPA do not apply).
45. Toeniskoetter, supra n. 12, at 8.
Vol. 72
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tion.46 If the communications have been stored less than 180 days, the gov-
ernment needs a warrant in compliance with the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure to obtain them. 47 If the communications are more than 180 days
old, the government may obtain them in one of three ways. First, it may
obtain the communications through a warrant in compliance with the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure without having to give notice to the sub-
scriber.48 Second, if the government gives notice to the subscriber, it may
obtain the communications by an administrative subpoena authorized by
law or a grand jury, or by a trial subpoena. 49 Third, the government can
obtain a court order for the records after making a showing to a court that it
has "specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds
to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the
records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation." 50 The entity may obtain transactional information
by obtaining a warrant that complies with the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure by making a probable cause showing or by obtaining a court
order as described above.5 1
The Pen Register Act regulates when and how the government may
install pen registers and trap and trace devices. 52 A pen register is "a device
or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signal-
ing information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire
or electronic communication is transmitted . . ."53 The definition specifi-
cally excludes content of any communication, device, or process used by
the provider for billing, cost accounting, or other similar purposes in the
ordinary course of business. 54 A trap and trace device is "a device or pro-
cess which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which iden-
tify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signal-
ing information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or elec-
tronic communication .. . -55 This definition also excludes specifically the
content of communications. 56 Unlike some of the requirements for ob-
taining stored information, the entity is not required, under any circum-
46. 18 U.S.C. § 2703. See also Toeniskoetter, supra n. 12, at 9.
47. Id. at § 2703(a).
48. Id. at § 2703(b)(A).
49. Id. at § 2703(b)(B)(i).
50. Id. at § 2703(b)(B)(ii), (d).
51. Id. at § 2703(c)(1)(A)-(B), (d). The entity may also obtain the records with the consent of the
subscriber, or in certain circumstances involving telemarketing fraud. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (c)(I)(C)-(D).
52. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127.
53. Id. at § 3127(3).
54. Id.
55. Id. at § 3127(4).
56. Id.
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stances, to give notice to the subscriber. 57 As long as a court receives an
application from a law enforcement officer or United States Attorney who
has certified "the information likely to be obtained by such installation and
use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation" and the application is
otherwise complete, the court must grant the application. 58
CALEA enables law enforcement agents to "access call-identifying in-
formation that is reasonably available to the carrier ... before, during or
immediately after the transmission of a wire or electronic communication
... . 59 The statute narrows the scope of "call-identifying information" that
carriers are required to provide when law enforcement is authorized only to
install a pen register or a trap and trace device, to exclude "any information
that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber .. ".. ,6o This ex-
clusion suggests that to obtain cell site data, law enforcement must obtain
something more than a court order based merely on a certification that the
information sought "is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation."
IV. FEDERAL TREATMENT OF CITIZENS' PRIVACY AND SEARCH
INTERESTS IN CELL PHONE LOCATION TRACKING
A. United States Supreme Court Cases
As with all discussions of an individual's right of privacy and whether
a search was unreasonable, this analysis begins with Justice Harlan's fa-
mous test from his concurrence in Katz v. United States,6' commonly re-
ferred to as the "Katz test." In Katz, the Court held that the warrantless use
of an eavesdropping device that picked up only sound waves that reached
the exterior of a phone booth constituted an unreasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment because Katz "justifiably relied" on the privacy of the
telephone booth.62 Harlan wrote that for a privacy interest to exist under
the Fourth Amendment, (1) the person must have a subjective expectation
of privacy and (2) society must be willing to recognize her subjective ex-
pectation as objectively reasonable. 63 The Katz test has become the con-
trolling standard for determining whether an individual has a constitution-
ally protected privacy interest, and if so, whether a search of that interest
was unreasonable. Without a warrant, a search of a constitutionally pro-
tected privacy interest is "presumptively unreasonable .'64
57. See id. at § 3123(d)(2).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1), (2).
59. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2).
60. Id. at § 1002(a)(2)(B).
61. Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
62. Id. at 353, 359.
63. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
64. Id.
270 Vol. 72
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The privacy interest in cell phone location tracking information can be
framed in two ways. The first way is whether an individual has a subjective
expectation of privacy in the cell phone records that are held by a third-
party service provider, and if so, whether society is willing to recognize that
expectation as reasonable. The second way it can be framed is whether an
individual has an expectation of privacy in his or her location, and if so,
whether society is willing to recognize that interest as reasonable. As to the
first question-whether one has a privacy interest in records held by a third
party-the answer depends on the jurisprudence of the jurisdiction in which
the individual is located. The courts' answer to the second question thus far
has been "no," finding that society is not willing to recognize an individ-
ual's expectation of privacy in his or her location as reasonable.
The United States Supreme Court has considered both questions. In
Smith v. Maryland,65 the Court determined that a person does not have an
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the records held by a third-
party service provider. The Court considered whether law enforcement's
warrantless use of a pen register was presumptively unreasonable. 66 Bor-
rowing the assumption of the risk doctrine from tort law, the Court held that
by dialing a number the subscriber knows will be recorded by the third-
party service provider, the caller assumes the risk that the service provider
will give this information to law enforcement. 67
In United States v. Knotts,68 the Court held that a person does not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her location when in plain
view on public roads. In Knotts, law enforcement placed an electronic
tracking beeper inside a container of choloroform. 69 Law enforcement
tracked the suspect's movements initially with both visual and tracking
beeper surveillance. 70 Officers eventually lost sight of the suspect, and the
beeper alone led them to a cabin where they found suspects operating a
clandestine lab.71 The Court held that monitoring the beeper was not an
unreasonable search and that the suspect had no right to privacy on the open
roads because both the car and the occupants were in plain view. 72 The
Court further held that "[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the
police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth
with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this
65. Smith v. Md., 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
66. Id. at 741-742.
67. Id. at 744-745.
68. U.S. 1P. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
69. Id. at 278.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 278-279.
72. Id. at 281-282.
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case." 73 The Court's rationale for this holding rested on the fact that al-
though law enforcement officers lost sight of the suspect, they would have
been able to determine the cabin's location through visual observation had
they maintained the surveillance.74
In United States v. Karo,75 however, the Court held a similar search to
be unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth Amendment.76 A tracking
beeper placed inside a container of ether was used to locate the container
inside the suspect's house.77 The Court's rationale for distinguishing this
case from Knotts rested on the location of the bucket within the house,
which could not have been visually verified from outside. 78 In Knotts, on
the other hand, the cabin's location could be visually verified by following
the car, and law enforcement did not monitor the beeper while the can con-
taining the beeper was inside the cabin. 79
Cell phone location tracking can be distinguished from Smith because
most callers do not understand that their cell phone providers are recording
and storing their cell site data, let alone that cell phone providers can actu-
ally identify their exact locations. Callers cannot "assume the risk" of
something they do not even know is happening. As in Karo, officers cannot
tell whether the tracking device, in this case a cell phone, is or is not inside
a home since most people carry them in their pocket, purse, or someplace
similar. Even visual observation of a suspect does not allow officers to
determine whether the cell phone is within the sanctity of the home. War-
rantless tracking of a person's cell phone only while the possessor is outside
of a home or private place would require personal surveillance. If the of-
ficer must personally watch the suspect to determine when he is in his
home, it defeats the point of cell phone location tracking.
Karo and Knotts can be compared to cell phone location tracking be-
cause the person with the phone is the person about whom law enforcement
seeks information, just as the suspects who possessed the containers in
Karo and Knotts were the people about whom law enforcement sought in-
formation. The only way for law enforcement to obtain this location infor-
mation about the suspect is to track the "container" that is linked to the
suspect, in this case, a cell phone. Since cell phones are small, they can be
concealed much more easily than a container of ether or chloroform.
Therefore, when the possessor of the phone goes into his home, as the
container did in Karo, law enforcement cannot know that fact without the
73. Id. at 282.
74. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.
75. U.S. v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
76. Id. at 714.
77. Id. at 708-710.
78. Id. at 714.
79. Id. at 713-715.
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help of visual observation. Even then, law enforcement might not be able
to tell if the cell phone is inside the house or, for example, in a car parked in
the driveway.
Obtaining a search warrant based on probable cause would be the most
prudent method for obtaining this information for both the police and the
public. That way, the prosecutor avoids the risk of having the evidence
suppressed as in Karo. Securing a warrant also protects the public because
a neutral judiciary is making the determination rather than an officer who is
personally involved.
B. Federal Circuit and District Court Cases
United States v. Forest,80 decided by the Sixth Circuit in 2004, is cur-
rently the only federal Court of Appeals case examining the subject of cell
phone location tracking. In Forest, defendants Forest and Garner appealed
their convictions for conspiring to distribute cocaine by arguing "the gov-
ernment violated their statutory and constitutional rights by intercepting cell
phone data that revealed their location while they were traveling on public
highways." '8 1 DEA agents obtained district court authorization to intercept
communications on the defendants' cell phones. 82 These orders also re-
quired the service provider, Sprint, to disclose all "subscriber information,
toll records, and other information relevant to the government's investiga-
tion." 83 The agents attempted to keep visual contact but were not always
able to do so. Consequently, one of the agents called Garner's cell phone
throughout the day without allowing it to ring on Garner's end. The agents
then used Sprint's computer data to determine which towers were receiving
signals from Garner's phone, thereby giving them Garner's general loca-
tion. 84
Garner argued that evidence against him should have been suppressed
because "the DEA's use of cell site data effectively turned his cell phone
into a tracking device, violating his rights under both Title III of the Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2110-2522,
and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ' 85 The court
held correctly that the cell site data did not constitute "electronic communi-
cations." 86 Because the records did not constitute "electronic communica-
80. Forest, 355 F.3d 942.
81. Id. at 946.
82. Id. at 947.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 948. This statute is Title III of the Wiretap Act.
86. See supra n. 40-43 and accompanying text for a more detailed explanation of why cell phone
location tracking is not considered "electronic communication" under 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).
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tions," the suppression remedies available under the Wiretap Act did not
apply. The court noted that assuming the defendant's phone was a "track-
ing device" under 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (Title I of the ECPA), United States v.
Gbemisola was persuasive in its holding that § 3117 does not provide any
suppression remedies.8 7
The Forest court then addressed Garner's Fourth Amendment argu-
ment. Because Garner had been tracked only while on public highways, the
court concluded that Knotts controlled and Garner had no "expectation of
privacy in the cell site data because the DEA agents could have obtained the
same information by following Garner's car." 88 The court reiterated that
"[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting
the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as
science and technology afforded them in this case," which is exactly what
the DEA did with the cell site data.8 9
Garner then argued that Knotts was distinguishable because the beeper
in Knotts was government-owned, unlike the cell site data, and that his con-
tract with Sprint did not authorize disclosure of cell site data.90 Garner also
argued that unlike in Smith, he did not voluntarily convey his cell site data
because he was not dialing out; the DEA was dialing his number. In con-
trast, Garner argued, Smith had voluntarily conveyed the numbers he dialed
himself.9' The court dismissed these arguments. Because Garner was on a
public highway, he had no legitimate expectation of privacy and, therefore,
the agent's actions were not a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 92 With no search under the Fourth Amendment, no Fourth
Amendment exclusion remedies were available to Garner.
Though Forest is the only Court of Appeals case addressing cell phone
location tracking, several federal district courts have considered the issue.
Prior to 2005, federal district courts granted requests routinely for cell site
data under the authority of the Pen Register Act, SCA, or the Wiretap Act. 93
In August 2005, Magistrate Judge Orenstein "upset the apple cart" with his
revolutionary holding in New York 1.94 He stated that although he had rou-
87. Forest, 355 U.S. at 949-950 (citing Gbemisola, 225 F.3d at 758); see supra n. 34, regarding
Gbemisola.
88. Forest, 355 U.S. at 951.
89. Id. (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 951-952.
93. Samuel, supra n. 22, at 1328. See also In re Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 384 F.
Supp. 2d 562, 563, 566 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), on reconsideration sub nom. In re Application of the U.S. for
an Or. (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that although other jurisdictions have resolved this issue, no case law on point
exists for examination).
94. Samuel, supra n. 22, at 1328.
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tinely granted applications for cell site data in the past without questioning
the legal basis, he denied the current application because correcting that
mistake now was better than allowing that flawed practice to continue in the
future.95
In New York I, the government requested cell site data under the SCA,
which only requires "specific and articulable facts" showing that the "elec-
tronic communication" is "relevant and material to an ongoing criminal in-
vestigation." 96 Judge Orenstein determined that although the requested in-
formation might appear to be the contents of an "electronic communica-
tion," the definition of electronic communication specifically excludes
"tracking devices," and that in this case, the cell phone was used as a track-
ing device. 97 He therefore denied the application for cell site data under the
SCA.98 Judge Orenstein next analyzed whether the application could be
granted under the Pen Register Act.99 Reading the Act in conjunction with
CALEA, he determined that Congress specifically prohibited service prov-
iders from giving law enforcement information disclosing the physical loca-
tion of the subscriber.' 00 He held: "In other words, where a carrier's assis-
tance to law enforcement is ordered on the basis of something less than
probable cause, such assistance must not include disclosure of a sub-
scriber's physical location." 101
Two months after New York I was decided, in October 2005, Magis-
trate Judge Smith followed Judge Orenstein with his decision in Texas 1.102
He held that prospective cell site data qualifies as tracking device informa-
tion under Title I of the ECPA and that a probable cause warrant under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 is the appropriate standard that must
be applied.' 0 3 He also held the government may not obtain such data under
the Pen Register Act, SCA, or the Wiretap Act by themselves.'°4 Further,
Judge Smith rejected the Government's hybrid theory in which the SCA is
used in conjunction with CALEA and the Pen Register Act as being "little
more than a retrospective assemblage of disparate statutory parts to achieve
a desired result."' 1 5 He reasoned that "if these various statutory provisions
95. In re Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 566 (quoting Henslee v. Union
Planters Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Wisdom too
often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late.")).
96. Id. at 563.
97. Id. at 564.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 565.
100. Id.
101. In re Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
102. Application for Pen Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 747.
103. Id. at 752.
104. Id. at 757.
105. Id. at 765.
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were intended to give birth to a new breed of electronic surveillance, one
would expect Congress to have openly acknowledged paternity somewhere
along the way." 106 He also noted that law enforcement efforts would not be
hindered by this decision because law enforcement could always apply for a
warrant under the Rule 41 probable cause standard.10 7
Since these decisions in 2005, many other federal cases have been de-
cided with mixed results. 0 8 Some courts have held that probable cause is
required under the law; others that a lesser standard is adequate. Even
though the United States Supreme Court and federal district courts have
stated that nothing in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence stops officers from
augmenting their natural senses, this outcome could be different under
Montana constitutional law. Although Montana courts may find guidance
in looking to the limited federal law on the issue of cell phone location
tracking, they also have the additional guidance of Article II, § 10 of the
1972 Montana Constitution-Montana citizens' explicit right of privacy-
as well as Article II, § 11-Montana citizens' right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.
V. CELL PHONE LOCATION TRACKING UNDER MONTANA LAW
A. 1972 Constitutional Convention
Article II, § 10 of the Montana Constitution provides: "The right of
individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall
not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest." The
1972 Constitutional Convention delegates put much thought into this provi-
sion. The delegates included this provision because of concerns about gov-
ernment surveillance of Montana citizens and the increasing sophistication
106. Id. at 764.
107. Id. at 765.
108. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Or. Authorizing the Release of Prospective Cell Site
Info., 407 F. Supp. 2d 134 (D.D.C. 2006); In re the Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the
Disclosure of Prospective Cell Site Info., 412 F. Supp. 2d 947 (E.D. Wis. 2006); In re the Application of
the U.S. for an Or. Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register &/or Trap & Trace for Mobile
Identification No. (585) 111-1111 & the Disclosure of Subscriber & Activity Info. under 18 U.S.C. 2703,
415 F. Supp. 2d 211 (W.D.N.Y. 2006); In re the Application of the U.S. for an Or. Authorizing the
Installation & Use of a Pen Register with Caller Identification Device & Cell Site Location Authorit' on
a Certain Cellular Tel., 415 F. Supp. 2d 663 (S.D.W. Va. 2006); In re Application of the U.S. for Or.
Authorizing the Installation & Use of Pen Registers & Caller Identification Devices on Tel. Nos.
(Sealed), 416 F. Supp. 2d 390 (D. Md. 2006); In re Application of the U.S. for an Or.: (1) Authorizing
the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device; & (2) Authorizing Release of Sub-
scriber Info. &/or Cell Site Info., 411 F. Supp. 2d 678 (W.D. La. 2006); In re Application of the U.S. for
an Or.: (1) Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device, & (2) Author-
izing Release of Subscriber & Other Info., 433 F. Supp. 2d 804 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
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of surveillance mechanisms. 10 9 Delegate Robert Campbell believed that
participating members of society understand the State must intrude into
their private lives at times, but the State should not do so unless it has "a
good reason for being there." '" 0 He stated that including an explicit right of
privacy would "guarantee our individual citizens of Montana this very im-
portant right-the right to be let alone; and this has been called the most
important right of them all."' 1
Delegate Campbell explained the purpose of including Article II, § 10
when he read from a February 3, 1972, Montana Standard article. The
quotation illustrates the concerns that led the delegates to insert an individ-
ual privacy provision in the newly crafted constitution:
Times change. That in a nutshell, is why the Constitutional Convention dele-
gates in Helena are working on a new and more modem governmental charter
for Montana. Today, with wiretaps, electronic and bugging devices, photo
surveillance equipment and computerized data banks, a person's privacy can
be invaded without his knowledge and the information so gained can be mis-
used in the most insidious ways. It isn't only a careless government that has
this power to pry; political organizations, private information gathering firms,
and even an individual can now snoop more easily and more effectively than
ever before. We certainly hope that such snooping is not as widespread as
some persons would have us believe, but with technology easily available and
becoming more refined all the time, prudent safeguards against the misuses of
such technology are needed. Some may urge and argue that this is a legisla-
tive, not a constitutional issue. We think the right of privacy is like a number
of other inalienable rights; a carefully worded constitutional article reaffirm-
ing this right is desirable. Wade Dahood of Anaconda, Chairman of the Bill
of Rights Committee, hit the nail on the head when he said: "As government
functions and controls expand, it is necessary to expand the rights of the indi-
vidual." The right to privacy deserves specific protection. 1' 2
Several delegates strongly voiced their distaste for the use of electronic
surveillance in Montana. Delegate Mae Nan Robinson stated that she be-
lieved "there is certainly no justification for [electronic surveillance] in this
state" and that "no case has been or can be made for wiretapping in the
State of Montana, to have such a blatant disregard of privacy of individu-
als."' '3 She further stated that privacy and wiretapping, or other electronic
surveillance, were "probably [the] two most incompatible things that you
could ever have."'' 14 Delegate David Holland agreed and stated he "sup-
port[ed] the position that there should be no wiretapping or other electronic
109. Montana Constitutional Convention Proceedings vol. 5, 1680-1688, 1850-1853 (Mont. Legis.
& Legis. Council 1972) (available at http://courts.mt.gov/library/montana-laws.mcpx).
110. Id. at vol. 5, 1681.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at vol. 5, 1683, 1684.
114. Id. at 1683.
17
Schwandt: Government Location Tracking of Cell Phones
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2011
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
surveillance . . . ." 15 Perhaps the most powerful statement of distaste for
governmental wiretapping and electronic surveillance came from the mouth
of the Chairman of the Bill of Rights Committee, Delegate Wade Dahood.
He stated:
[I]t is inconceivable to any of us that there would ever exist a situation in the
State of Montana where electronic surveillance could be justified. And the
thinking throughout the United States is, electronic surveillance shall be justi-
fied only in matters involving national security, perhaps in matters involving
certain heinous federal crimes where the situation is such that in those in-
stances we must risk the fight of individual privacy because there is a greater
purpose to be served. But within the area of the State of Montana, we cannot
conceive of a situation where we could ever permit electronic surveillance.
we would not object to allow[ing] an amendment that would prohibit
electronic surveillance in the State of Montana. 116
Although such an amendment was never added, the delegates' inten-
tion was clear-they wanted to protect Montanans' privacy interests against
electronic surveillance as vigorously as they could. For instance, at one
point in the discussion, the delegates removed the phrase "without the
showing of a compelling state interest" from the language of Article II, § 10
so that it read: "The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being
of a free society and shall not be infringed." ' 17 This was done to "let [the]
statement about right of privacy simply stand just right there, barefaced, on
its own; that we have the right to privacy as stated" and out of fear that the
additional phrase "may be interpreted by whatever state agency happens to
have an interest in invading my privacy at that particular time."' 18 The
phrase was eventually reinserted after several delegates voiced their con-
cerns that its deletion might actually weaken the clause because, without
strict guidance, courts might interpret Article II, § 10 in a manner the dele-
gates did not intend. Delegate Thomas Ask summed up the delegates' ra-
tionale for reinserting the compelling state interest language:
By putting these words in, we're giving direction to the court how they are
going to interpret this. If there's no compelling state interest, you can't in-
vade a person's right of privacy . so we [need to reinsert the original lan-
guage to] clarify this issue and [not] cloud it up and create a legal hassle in
the years to come. 119
After the delegates unanimously passed Article II, § 10, they moved
on to debate Article II, § 11, the Montana Constitution's search and seizure
provision:
115. Montana Constitutional Convention Proceedings, supra n. 109, at vol. 5, 1683.
116. Id. at vol. 5, 1687.
117. Id. at vol. 5, 1681-1682.
118. Id. at vol. 5, 1682.
119. Id. at vol. 5, 1850-1851.
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The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or
seize any person or thing shall issue without describing the place to be
searched or the person or thing to be seized, nor without probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, reduced to writing.
Delegate Campbell was the first to comment during the discussion of Arti-
cle II, § 11, and he spoke again about the delegates' intent to protect
Montanans from electronic surveillance:
You may note that in our rough draft when we did present it to the Conven-
tion, it did contain specific information regarding electronic equipment and
surveillance. We at the committee felt very strongly that the people of Mon-
tana should be protected as much as possible against eavesdropping, elec-
tronic surveillance, and such type of activities. We also recognize that there
may in the future be a legitimate need for such in legitimate police activities.
After careful consideration of the rough draft that we did produce, we found
that the citizens of Montana are very suspicious of such type of activity. We
found from the law enforcement officers we talked to that there was really not
a need and such activity was not taking place at this time. 120
The specific language about electronic equipment and surveillance was not
included in the final version because the delegates recognized that law en-
forcement might someday have a legitimate reason for using this technol-
ogy, and the Legislature could deal with it at that time. 12' The delegates,
however, did not leave the matter at that. Delegate Campbell expressed the
Bill of Rights Committee's intent that Article II, § 11 be read in conjunc-
tion with Article II, § 10, thereby giving citizens broad protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 22
Although law enforcement informed the delegates that the activities
they were concerned about were not going on at the time, those activities
are certainly going on today. The delegates' forward-looking discussions,
thoughts, and protections were implemented for the purpose of protecting
Montanans from the always improving technology that may one day invade
the search, seizure, and privacy rights of Montanans. The delegates' clear
intent supports the argument that the government must have a compelling
state interest before it may use cell phone location tracking technology.
The Montana Supreme Court often looks to the transcripts of the 1972 Con-
stitutional Convention for guidance on how to interpret constitutional provi-
sions and has done so when interpreting Montanans' right to privacy and
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures on many occasions.
With that as a foundation, this article will now examine Montana's case law
on the subject of cell phone location tracking.
120. Id. at vol. 5, 1683.
121. Montana Constitutional Convention Proceedings, supra n. 109, at vol. 5, 1683.
122. Id.
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B. Montana Case Law
The Montana Supreme Court subscribes to the philosophy that state
courts are free to provide citizens greater rights and protections under state
constitutions than the federal Constitution provides, even if the language is
identical. For instance, the Montana Supreme Court has stated: "Indepen-
dent state grounds exist for this Court to extend greater privacy rights, and
thereby greater protection against unreasonable search and seizure, than
would be afforded under the Federal Constitution."'' 23 The independent
state ground referred to by the Court is the Montana Constitution's explicit
right of privacy in Article II, § 10.124 Moreover, Montana's Supreme Court
firmly adheres to the principle that it will not "march lockstep" with the
United States Supreme Court because of this independent state ground for
providing broader protections than those provided by the United States
Constitution. 125 By recognizing that the Montana Constitution's right of
privacy is to be read in conjunction with the Montana Constitution's right
against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court has honored the intent
of the delegates. The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that "the right to
privacy is the cornerstone of protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures."' 126
The Court has recognized that two types of privacy interests exist
under the Montana Constitution: informational privacy and autonomy pri-
vacy. Informational privacy has been defined as an "interest[ ] in preclud-
ing the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential informa-
tion."' 27 Autonomy privacy has been defined as "the interest[ ] in making
intimate personal decisions or conducting personal activities without obser-
vation, intrusion, or interference."'' 28 The Court analyzes these two privacy
rights somewhat differently. Because informational privacy fits this situa-
tion best-the government accesses cell site data that is held in phone
records generated by the service provider-autonomy privacy will not be
discussed further. Informational privacy will be examined in the context of
123. State v. Solis, 693 P.2d 518, 521 (Mont. 1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, State v. Goetz,
191 P.3d 489, 497 (Mont. 2008).
124. Id. at 520-521.
125. State v. Bullock, 901 P.2d 61, 70, 72, 74, 75 (Mont. 1995); State v. Siegal, 934 P.2d 176, 191
(Mont. 1997), rev'd in part on other grounds, State v. Kuneff, 970 P.2d 556 (Mont. 1998); Solis, 693
P.2d at 521; State v. Nelson, 941 P.2d 441, 447 (Mont. 1997) (citations omitted); Goetz, 191 P.3d at
496-497. Goetz overruled State v. Brown, 755 P.2d 1364 (Mont. 1988), because Brown was decided by
federal analysis without consideration of Montana's heightened right of privacy. Goetz, 191 P.3d at
496-497.
126. Siegal, 934 P.2d at 191 (citing Solis, 693 P.2d at 522-523).
127. Nelson, 941 P.2d at 448 (citing Hill v. Natl. Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 865 P.2d 633, 654 (Cal.
1994)).
128. Id.
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whether a search has occurred when the government seeks to obtain the
subscriber's cell phone records and cell site data from the service provider.
A search is defined as "the use of some means of gathering evidence
which infringes upon a person's reasonable expectation of privacy."' 129
Montana uses the "Goetz test," a three-pronged analysis similar to the Katz
test, to determine if a search has been conducted. Under the Goetz test, the
Court determines the following: (1) Does the person challenging the state's
action have an actual subjective expectation of privacy? (2) Is Montana
society 130 willing to recognize that subjective expectation as objectively
reasonable? and (3) What is the nature of the state's intrusion? 131
To decide whether a person has a subjective expectation of privacy, the
Court looks at the particular circumstances of each case and decides if the
person has "knowingly exposed something to the public," thereby surren-
dering his or her privacy protections. 132 To determine whether the second
prong has been met, the Court examines the underlying constitutional val-
ues "including respect for both private, subjective expectations and public
norms."' 133 In a case involving the constitutionality of technologically en-
hanced government surveillance, the Court will "identify the values at risk,
and vest the reasonable expectation of privacy test with those values."'134
Finally, to determine if the nature of the State's intrusion was valid,
the Court reads Article II, §§ 10 and 11 in conjunction. The Court first
examines whether the procedural safeguards of a probable cause warrant or
a warrant exception have been met under § 11; it then determines whether
the State has shown a compelling state interest as required by Article II,
§ 10.135 The purpose of reading the two provisions together is to ensure
that "an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy in
order to enforce the law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious to
entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the
arrest of criminals."' 136 A compelling state interest exists where the State is
enforcing its criminal laws to benefit and protect the fundamental rights of
its citizens. This enforcement must also be tailored closely to effectuate
only that compelling interest. 137 Where the State can show probable cause
129. State v. Cotterell, 198 P.3d 254, 263 (Mont. 2008) (citations omitted).
130. See Bullock, 901 P.2d at 76 ("which the society of this State is willing to recognize as reasona-
ble") (emphasis added).
131. Goetz, 191 P.3d at 497-498.
132. Id. at 498 (citing State v. Scheetz, 950 P.2d 722, 726-727 (Mont. 1997)).
133. Goetz, 191 P.3d at 499 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 500-501.
136. Id. at 501.
137. Solis, 693 P.2d at 522 (citations omitted); Siegal, 934 P.2d at 184 (citing State v. Pastos, 887
P.2d 199, 202 (Mont. 1994)).
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that a crime has been committed and that information relating to the com-
mission of the crime is in possession of a certain person or institution, it has
shown a compelling state interest. 138 The issue in an informational privacy
and search analysis in the cell site data context is whether a cell phone
subscriber has an actual, subjective expectation in cell phone records held
by a third-party service provider.
In Montana, the examination of privacy rights in information held by
third-party service providers has been limited to billing records. In Hastet-
ter v. Behan, the plaintiff sued an employee of a phone company under
Article II, § 10 for looking at the numbers the plaintiff dialed on his
landline telephone without the plaintiff's consent or knowledge. 139 This
case did not involve a government actor or a request by the government for
the information. 140 The Montana Supreme Court held in Hastetter that
"telephone billing records are not private matters because the public aware-
ness that such records are routinely maintained negates any constitutional
expectation of privacy regarding the records." 141
The Court's analysis of privacy expectations for landline phone billing
records in Hastetter does not apply to cell phone location tracking for sev-
eral reasons. First, because Hastetter involved private parties, no state ac-
tion was involved; therefore, Article II, § 11 was not implicated. In the
case of cell phone location tracking, a state actor would be the one ob-
taining the cell phone records containing the cell site data, thereby implicat-
ing an analysis under Article II, § 11 as well as § 10. Second, when law
enforcement looks at a billing record to see the numbers that have been
dialed, any location data, such as an area code, is merely incidental. When
law enforcement looks at the cell phone records containing location data to
track the person with the phone, it is looking at the records for the very
purpose of obtaining location data; the location data is not merely inciden-
tal.142 Tracking a person's exact location provides law enforcement with
information that is more intrusive and personal in nature than merely look-
ing at the numbers dialed on a phone. Third, landline records are more
general than cell phone records because the information generated by
landlines, which are typically in homes or businesses, provides information
about everyone who uses the landline in the home or the business. Con-
versely, cell phones are typically carried by only one person, meaning the
records are much more personal.
138. Nelson, 941 P.2d at 449.
139. Hastetter v. Behan, 639 P.2d 510, 511 (Mont. 1982).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 513.
142. See McLaughlin, supra n. 8, at 434-435 (using a similar analysis when discussing federal use
of pen registers rather than cell phone location tracking).
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Additionally, billing records from a landline cannot pinpoint a per-
son's exact location unless he is in his home making or receiving a call
because there are no registration signals generating cell site data that can be
triangulated. Landline telephones are associated with an address, so any
time a landline is used, the caller is at that address. Unlike a cell phone,
however, the landline does not follow the caller where he or she goes be-
cause it is attached to land; therefore, the information that can be gleaned
from a cell phone can be much more personal to the caller than information
gleaned from a landline. Even with the advent of "caller ID" with landline
phones, the only location data that is provided is incidental because, much
like a pen register, it only records the numbers of the incoming calls-not
the actual cell site data from cell phone towers that shows the caller's exact
location.
Finally, whereas the Hastetter Court held that a person gives up his
right to privacy because he knows the phone company is recording the
numbers dialed, most people do not know that their phones are broadcasting
registration signals every seven seconds, let alone that the service provider
is keeping this information. Because most subscribers have no knowledge
that the cell site data is being stored by their service providers, they cannot
be said to have voluntarily waived their constitutional expectation of pri-
vacy in those records. This analysis may change as people become more
aware of cell phone technologies and capabilities.
The next inquiry becomes whether, by looking at the facts of the case,
the subscriber "knowingly exposed something to the public and, conse-
quently, surrendered his ... privacy protections" when the records are held
by the third-party service provider.143 As stated above, most people do not
know that the registration process is even happening or that registration and
the calls they make or receive are generating records that contain informa-
tion that can pinpoint their location. Because people are oblivious to the
fact that their location data is being generated and recorded every seven
seconds, they cannot be said to have "knowingly" exposed anything. Also,
what they do knowingly expose, such as the numbers they dial, is not being
exposed to the public-it is being exposed to their service provider with
whom they likely have a contract. Again, this analysis will change as peo-
ple's knowledge about cell phone technology increases. In the meantime,
practitioners will need to read the individual contracts their clients have
with the respective service providers to ascertain whether they contain any
provisions regarding privacy or the release of information to third parties.
The hypothetical cell phone subscriber has not knowingly exposed his
cell site data, and he has certainly not exposed his cell site data to the pub-
143. Goetz, 191 P.3d at 498 (citing Scheetz, 950 P.2d at 726-727).
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lic-only to his service provider. Because he has not "knowingly exposed
something to the public," he cannot be said to have "surrendered his ...
privacy protections." He, therefore, has a subjective expectation of privacy
in his cell phone records held by the third-party service provider.
To determine whether Montana society recognizes a subjective expec-
tation of privacy as objectively reasonable, the Court looks to the underly-
ing values, "including respect for both private, subjective expectations and
public norms." 144 Also, when dealing with "technologically enhanced gov-
ernment surveillance," the Court will identify the values at risk and "vest
the reasonable expectation of privacy test with those values."' 45 The Court
takes seriously the intent of the delegates in framing that right. 146 Moreo-
ver, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures "protects people
not places,"' 147 and "what an individual seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."' 148
The Montana Supreme Court has frequently provided stronger protec-
tions under the Montana Constitution than are provided at the federal level.
In Goetz, the Court held that Montanans would find objectively reasonable
the defendant's subjective expectation that the government would not re-
cord his conversations without his knowledge, reiterating: "Montanans still
continue to cherish the privacy guaranteed them by Montana's Constitu-
tion."'149 In Siegal, law enforcement conducted a warrantless scan of the
defendant's house with a thermal imager. 150 Holding that this was an un-
reasonable search, the Court quoted the delegates' strong distaste for elec-
tronic surveillance by the government and commented that Montanans
would be "shocked and consider it a gross invasion of their privacy" to find
that the government was scanning their homes with a thermal imager with-
out a warrant or their consent. 151
The constitutional convention delegates' extensive discussion about
their disgust for electronic monitoring and surveillance demonstrates that
this is not a newly held belief by Montanans and is in fact the very reason
why the delegates thought including an explicit right to individual privacy
in the 1972 Montana Constitution was necessary. Because of these beliefs,
Montanans reasonably expect that the government will not snoop around in
144. Goetz, 191 P.3d at 499 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
145. Id.
146. See Siegal, 934 P.2d at 184, 190; Goetz, 191 P.3d at 499-500; Bullock, 901 P.2d at 75 ("Mon-
tana has a strong tradition of respect for the right to individual privacy."); Solis, 693 P.2d at 521-522
(quoting the Constitutional Convention transcripts extensively).
147. Bullock, 901 P.2d at 70.
148. Id. (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
149. Goetz, 191 P.3d at 500.
150. Siegal, 934 P.2d at 178.
151. Id. at 190-191.
Vol. 72
24
Montana Law Review, Vol. 72 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol72/iss2/3
2011 GOVERNMENT LOCATION TRACKING OF CELL PHONES 285
their cell phone records to spy on their locations without their knowledge.
Furthermore, Article II, § 11 protects the privacy interests that society
would deem reasonable, not the location in which those privacy interests
are kept. Thus, it protects a person's interest in his cell phone records, not
the records facility of a third-party service provider. Because the records
are "what an individual seeks to preserve as private," the records "may be
constitutionally protected" 152 if the third prong of the privacy test can also
be met. For these reasons, Montana society would find the hypothetical
phone subscriber's subjective expectation to privacy in his cell phone
records held by the third-party service provider to be objectively reasona-
ble.
The inquiry into the nature of the State's intrusion seeks to ensure that
the safeguards of Article II, § 11 have been met. 1 53 Article II, § 11 requires
either the State to obtain a warrant based on probable cause or the search to
fit a recognized warrant exception. 154 Probable cause exists "when facts
and circumstances presented to a magistrate would warrant an honest belief
in the mind of a reasonable and prudent person that an offense has been, or
is being, committed and that property (or information) sought exists at the
place designated." 155 The warrant requirement is necessary "so that an ob-
jective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce
the law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the
discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of
criminals." 156
Whether probable cause or a warrant exception exists would depend
on the facts of the case at issue. For example, a court would likely find the
search reasonable if the government searched a suspect's cell phone loca-
tion data after obtaining a warrant in order to corroborate an alibi. Al-
though the subscriber would have an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy, the State would have a compelling state interest in protecting other
members of society and solving a crime. Further, it would have the neces-
sary procedural safeguard of a neutral magistrate granting a search warrant
based on probable cause. However, if the government were conducting ran-
dom checks on citizens to see what they had been up to without "a good
reason for being there," as Delegate Campbell said, such a search likely
would not pass muster under the Montana Constitution.
152. Bullock, 901 P.2d at 70 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
153. Goetz, 191 P.3d at 500.
154. Id. at 500-501.
155. Nelson, 941 P.2d at 449 (citing Siegal, 934 P.2d at 193).
156. Goetz, 191 P.3d at 501.
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If cell phone location tracking is analyzed from the angle of informa-
tional privacy in the context of a search, the Montana Constitution likely
would protect Montanans from warrantless snooping by the government.
VI. CONCLUSION
Police are still able to use visual surveillance techniques; however,
when they lose sight of a suspect or cannot find a suspect to begin with, the
police must comply with the demands of the Montana Constitution before
obtaining the suspect's cell site data. To ensure the greatest protections for
Montanans and honor the intent of the delegates in crafting the 1972 Mon-
tana Constitution, the best argument for preventing abuse of cell phone lo-
cation tracking technology is that it implicates an informational privacy in-
terest under Article II, § 10, read in conjunction with the right against un-
reasonable search and seizures in Article II, § 11. This argument comports
with the established framework of Goetz.
Because Montanans still value their right of privacy and their right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, the cell phone records that
convey Montanans' whereabouts should only be available to law enforce-
ment after a showing of probable cause or with a warrant exception. Track-
ing someone by using police visual surveillance techniques should be the
rule, not the exception. Police officers should not be able to use technology
to find someone whom they could not find with good old-fashioned sleuth
work, unless they obtain a warrant and show a compelling state interest in
invading a person's private records to a neutral judiciary.
As the use of cell phone tracking becomes more prevalent in Montana,
the Court or the Legislature may implement a novel standard of review or
statutory framework for analyzing this situation or obtaining cell site data.
Until then, the Goetz test appears to be the best candidate for keeping the
rights guaranteed to Montanans under the 1972 Constitution intact, and to
address and recognize the forward-looking concerns of the delegates.
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